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SCIENCE SEEMS TO HAVE a most embarrassing way of up-
setting what have long been recognized as firmly established
principles of law.
Substantive rules, as old as English jurisprudence, find
themselves unceremoniiously jostled out of place by modern
invention. The result is sleepless nights for hapless jurists,
confusion for those who write and publish textbooks, brain-fag
for the student and utter despair for those burdened with the
duty of expounding in the classroom what is the law of the land.
Take the airplane, for instance, and its debonair delight in
winging its way wheresoever it pleases with all the freedom of
an untamed bird.
A generation or so ago the Scriptures themselves were not
more certain than the proposition that the owner of the fee in
land was its absolute master---"from the center of the earth to
the zenith." Every unwarranted intrusion, whether on the sur-
face, above or below, was an actionable trespass. When balloons
first began to wobble their way across-country, the law began
to blink and wonder. Today the air is streaked with wings and
loud with the drone of motors. Is every such trip a trespass?
And do passengers share the tort with pilots?
Imagine the confusion of Lord Coke if some blithe young
barrister had questioned him as to the application of the Rule
in Shelley's Case to navigation of the "stratosphere"!
Then came phonograph and crystal-set and silver screen,
and the first thing they bumped into was the law of copyrights,
which has so complicated the matter of multiple reproduction
that one wonders whenever he turns a dial whether he is laying
himself liable to action.
And now long-crystallized conceptions of the law of defa-
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mation seem headed for the discard because of scientific prog-
ress.
It was bad enough when the introduction of stenography
and typing raised the question whether the dictater made a, pub-
lication to the amanuensis who set down pothooks in her note-
book and pounded them out on her keyboard or whether a
privilege existed between the secretary and her employer.
And now we have the question as to how shall be classified
the utterances of one who wounds the feelings of his fellow man
by what he speaks into the omnipresent microphone.
Is it libel, or is it slander?
Shall it be visited with the strict responsibility of him who
writes awry in his widely-circulated newspaper for all the world
to see, or may it escape with the comparatively meager penalty
of him who gossips in the corner grocery store?
With this problem the courts are being called upon to
wrack their brains, and over it none-too-profound state legisla-
tures are mulling.
We shall not attempt anything like an exhaustive exam-
ination of cases on the point. Neither shall we tackle more than
a suggestion of the states which have legislated on the question.
This is no profound legal treatise. If it but suggests a train of
thought, it will have served its purpose.
Let us first take a quick look at the historic background of
the matter, with a definition or two, perhaps.
The prevailing mode of considering the wrong or defama-
tion is, we assume, to view it as a single tort, which may be
committed by two different means. It is an injury to the repu-
tation of another, caused by two different instrumentalities.
When one of these instruments is used, the injury is presumed
to be greater and the penalty is more severe. It is as if we
said that an injury to the body may be caused either by gunshot
or by sticks and stones. One naturally concludes a distinction
in the degree of harm and the consequent legal liability be-
tween them.
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The two means by which one's character may be defamed
and his reputation injured we call respectively libel and slander.
Just how to draw the line between them has caused a bit of
bother. Some authorities have approached the problem subjec-
tively, others objectively. The subjectivists have attempted to
enumerate the various means by which defamatory matter could
be communicated-by speaking, by singing, by playing, a mel-
ody, by whistling a tune, in the case of slander; by writing, by
printing, by caricature, by hanging in effiigy, in the case of libel.
The very effort to enumerate has created its own difficulty, for,
no sooner did one feel that his list was complete, than somebody
would suggest still another means.
The objectivists, on the other hand, have selected the senses
of the recipient, upon which the publication was registered. If
it reached the hearing, it was slander; if the sense of sight, it
was libel.
Which was all very well, we might digress to observe, until
along came the talking movie, which registered upon both
senses in the same fell swoop.
The importance of being able to determine in which class a
particular utterance falls is, of course, obvious ot the most casual
student of the subject. Primarily it has to do with the differ-
ence between those publications which are actionable per se if
uttered so as to constitute slander-and thus relieve the plain-
tiff of the necessity of proving he has been pecuniarily damaged
-and those which are so actionable as libel.
The "per se" list in libel being most comfortingly broader
than in slander, it is, of course, tremendously to the advantage
of the aggrieved in a large number of cases to have his troubles
recognized in the former class.
The reasons for the differences are also in the A-B-C of
every Freshman. They are three:
First, libelous utterances (in the simplest classification, those
reduced to "black and white") are presumed to be the result of
greater deliberation, and hence of greater malice;
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Second, they are supposed to reach a larger number of
people who might thus hold the plaintiff in disesteem, and,
Third, they are credited with greater permanency, and thus
a more lasting hurt.
Judged by these standards-as old as the Common Law-
shall we then say that defamatory utterances over the ether are
libel, or are they slander?
At least two courts, and a number of legislatures-although
perhaps without giving too much thought to the measuring
sticks we have just set down-have deliberately put them in
the former class.
We suggest a glance at two decisions. The first is Sorensen
v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932), and the other
is Miles v. Wasmer, 172 Wash. 466, 20 Pac. (2nd) 847
(1933). Both of these decisions-the second ostensibly dodg-
ing the difficulty yet adopting the conclusions of the first, explic-
itly declare that defamation via radio is libel.
We have not the means to accumulate the statutory declara-
tions on the subject, but we do know that the state legislature
of Washington, in the current year, formally enacted the opin-
ion of the Miles case into law.
The pleasant thing about inditing a purely personal treat-
ise like the present is the utter freedom one feels in disagreeing
completely with the crowned heads of both Appellate Courts
and Houses of Assembly.
And so we enthusiastically proceed to weigh the opinions
cited above in the light of the standards hereinbefore enum-
erated.
Judged first, if you please, by the standard of antecedent
deliberation, what right has anyone to conclusively presume
that an utterance through a microphone has been set down and
pondered over more than one spoken without the intervention
of that pesky little device? True, most radio speeches are
delivered from prepared manuscript-although one may, as,
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let us say, the volatile but highly entertaining Huey, lay the
manuscript aside at any time in favor of the dynamic inspira-
tions of the moment. But so also (worse luck!) are most of the
other speeches one must listen to these days, painfully watching
the orator turn his pages one by one and hoping against hope
that he will skip a couple.
Secondly, does the fact that one's words go trippingly out
upon the ether from the spiderlike web of a broadcasting station
necessarily infer the existence of a large and eager audience sit-
ting breathless to drink them in? A thousand times no! Not
while turning a dial is no more laborious than brushing off an
unwelcome fly. What a blow to one's pride it might be if he
could only know the number of switches that go "snap" almost
before he has gotten any further than "Dear Friends of the
Radio Audience." Rather than presuming wide reception for
political emissions from every little one-horse radio station,
why not give the benefit of the doubt, if any, to the audience of
a thousand-or five, ten, or a hundred thousand-wedged into
an amphitheater whence it is none too easy to extricate oneself
in the event that the speech being made is not to one's liking?
And, as for the best of permanency, surely there is no more
in the case of radio speeches than of any other kind. Even less
-if we may take the word of scientists who say that ether
waves travel so much faster than sound waves that a radio pro-
gram gets to the receiving set (and is heard and most likely
forgotten) before it reaches persons actually in the room where
it is broadcast.
By what logic, or what authoirty (historically legal or oth-
erwise) are we then to say that radio talks are libel and un-radio
talks are not? If the distinction will not stand the test of norms
eight centuries old, what basis is there for it? In all fairness,
we should be supplied with some new standards before the old
ones are so ruthlessly snatched from us.
Courts or no courts, therefore-legislatures or no legisla-
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tures-we unblushingly proclaim our continued opinion that
defamation on the ether differs no whit from that without it.
But, just in closing, may we have the boldness to ask our
friends of bench and legislative hall to solve one problem:
How would you wish us to classify a defamatory utterance
delivered to a present audience in a public hall and simultane-
ously broadcast over Station XYZ?
